Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1981

Stanley Martin Redd, Sheila M. Redd, His Wife;
Sterling Hardson Redd, Jill D. Redd, His Wife; Paul
Dutson And Donna Dutson, His Wife v. Western
Savings & Loan Company : Addition of New
Authority To Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors. Richard W. Giaque and James R. Holbrook; Attorneys for
RespondentNeil R. Sabin; Attorney for Appellants
Recommended Citation
Supplemental Submission, Redd v. Western Savings & Loan, No. 17231 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2424

This Supplemental Submission is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STANLEY MARTIN REDD,
SHEILA M. REDD, his wife;
STEFL ING HARDSON REDD,
JILL D. REDD, his wife;
PAUL DUTSON and DONNA
DUTSON, his wife,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ADDITION OF NEW AUTHORITY
TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiffs-Respondents.)
)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
WESTERN SAVINGS & LOAN
COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.
The
Utah

Rules

Case No. 17231

)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
of

Civil

Procedure,

pursuant

to

Rule

submit additional

75 (p) (3),

authority

in

support of their position in the above-entitled case.
Attached
Panko

v.

Pan

Civil 47918

hereto

American

as

Exhibit

Federal

"A"

is the

Savings and

recent case of

Loan

Association,

1

(Cal. App., filed June 1, 1981).

The

Panko

1.

The

case

supports

the

Appellants'

agruments

as

follows:

brief

at

21)

Respondent,

and

in

oral

both

in

its

argument,

has

brief

(Respondent's

asserted

that

the

California courts have held that it is reasonable and equitable
to

enforce

property.

the

due-on-sale

Panko,

however,

clause

with

respect

to

investment

involved a commercial building.

See

FI LED
JUN 15 1981
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......................----···--------·----···-··Clork. Supreme Court, Utoh

Pei
c;

nko

at

J •

The

!:'_a nko court,

specifically

ion,

reversing

recognized

the

2.
of

those

regulations

authorizing

The Respondent,

has alleged

holds

that the

Respondent's
a

that

enforcement

of

which assumes the preemptive effect of

br:ief

federally
California

the

arguments

by

the

law is

of

Panko

State

of

Utah

the

should

at

21-23.

The

Appellants,

the State of

Panko case,

chartered savings and loan,

See, Panko at 13.
case,

due-on-sale

Respondent has the statutory right to en-

tions.
the

non-

Bank of America, 148 Cal.

force due-on-sale clauses pursuant to statutes of

involving

to

(1978). See, Panko at 1 and at n. 3.

regulations contrar:y to

Utah.

cour:t deci-

At issue in the instant case is the affect, if any,

federal

clauses.

lower

applicability

residential property of Wellenkamp v.
Rptr. 379, 582 P.2d 970

the

not preempted by

however:,

specifically

federal

r:egula-

Using the same analysis and rationale
Appellants ar:gue

apply

with

respect

that

the

to

the

laws of

the

due-on-sale

clause.
DATED this 15th day of June, 1981.

NE
R. SABIN
Attorney for Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of June, 1981, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be
hand delivered to Richard W. Giauque, James R. Holbrook and
Stephen T. Har:d, of Giauque, Holbrook, Bendinger: & Gur:mankin,
P.C., 500 .Kearns Buil<ling, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, attorneys
for: Respondent.
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FOl~

CELTiFlU
I~;

-irlt

PUDUCATlOM

COPY

OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUHT

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISFlN ONE
JUt-: -11981
U:urt i~::~~.al- Fir::t ~P- Dist.
CLJ,' ..,:,., \.. r.ir:n:r., Cl~r~

STANLEY E. PANKO and GEORGE
L. S HKLAIP.,
Plaintiffs

~nd

Appellants,

u;~~~~~-=~--,_
I.>~

l Civil 47918

vs.

(Super.Ct.No. 2279e7)

PAN AMERICAN FlDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATIOi~, PAN
AHERICAN SERVICE CORPORATION,
Defendants end Respondents.

In this

opp~al

rule announced by
A~erica

ou~

we address the question whether the

Supreme Court in

~ellenkamp

v. Sank of

(1978) 21 Cal.3d 943 applies with equal force to a

federally chartered

~avings

and loan association.

Wellenkamc applies;

~ccordingly,

hold that

~e

we reverse the judgment.

facts
Joseph and :,andra Karp were owners of a commercial
building in San Mateo.

In November 1977 they refinanced the

property, obtaining o loan from Pan American federal Savings
nnd Loan Association for $161,000, bearing interest at the rate
or ten percent per

~nnum,

secured by a deed of trust.

l

The

1. The rcflnonclng ·:as part or en option cgreemcmt b~ttteen the
Kerps ~nd plaintiffs. An nbstract uf option ogreement was
(Fn. continued n~xt page.)
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C':

·u

(,f

t rw.t cnr1ta.incd a slancJ2:-cl due-on-s0le clause provicJing

for.<:cCl·lri;itr·ci

p0yr;1~·nt

in the event of sale.

Ir1 Jurw 1970 the Varps sold th<:: property to plaintiffs, Starilcy P0nko and George Sinclair, who took title to the
property "subject to" the Pan American deed of trust.

Plain-

tiffs tendered a timely monthly payment due to Pan American in
July 1978, but Pan American declined to accept it.

Acting

under the authority of the due-on-sale clause, Pan American
demanded full payment of the loan balance.
On August 16, 1978, Pan American recorded a Notice of
Default citing the Karps' "failure to pay Interest and Principal payments."

On November 21, 1978, plaintiffs filed a com-

plaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to enjoin
Pan American from enforcing the due-on-sale clause.

There-

after, Pan American noved for summary judgment on the ground
that federal statutes and regulations governing federally
chartered savings and loan associations preempted California
law and permitted enrorcement of the due-on-sale clause.

The

trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action.

This

appeal ensued.

recorded on November 13, 1977. A termination of option agree~ent ~as recorded on December 2, 1977.
An abstract of option
agreement ~as re-recorded on December 5, 1977. Thus, at the
time of the Karps' refinancing (November 28, 1977), Pan American had constructive notice of plaintiffs' option to purchase
the property.

2
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8<Jckr'round
In
hcis tn:f'n

<J

reren~

~atter

feder<ll courts.

yr~rs

the validity of due-on-sale clauses

of corisioerable controversy in state and
In California our Supreme Court has determined

that enforcement of a due-on-sale clause upon occurrence of an
outright sale constitutes an unreasonable restraint on alienatian "unless the lencer can demonstrate that enforcement is
reasonably necessary to protect against impairment to its
security or the risk of default."

(Wellenkamp v. Bank of

America, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 953.)

1

The court's decision was

grounded on Civil Code section 711, 2 foreshadowed by two
earlier interpretations of that statute.
Sav.

&

(See Tucker v. Lassen

Loan Assn. (1J74) 12 Cal.3d 629 [due-on-sale clause not

automatically enforceable upon execution of installment sale
contract]; LaSala v. American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 5 Cal.3d
864 [acceleration clause not automatically enforceable upon
creation of junior encumbrance].)
Here, Pan

~merican

concedes that it can make no show-

ing of an impairment to its security or risk of default as a
result of the outright sale of the property to

plaintiffs~

Consequently, under California law the due-on-sale clause
contained in the deed of trust herein would not be

2. Section 711 of ~he Civil Code provides: "Conditions
restninirig alienation, ~hen repugnant to the interest created,
are void."

3
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i, 1 rcf_,c,:r-

zir1:J

:ic,_1r1

5

,•,sci-:iatiori, contends thJt it can not

Califo:-nia 1,a
of

th~

f'0r1 A•;,, rican, a ft::chc:rally chartered savings

0

b~

bound by

sir1ce it is exclusively governed by regulations

Federal Home Lo2n 8Jnk Board (Board) which preempt con-

flicting state laws.
In 1933 the Home Owners' Loan Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 14611470) was enacted by Congress creating the Board and authorizing the establishment of federal savings and loan associations.

While the associations are specifically empowered to

extend real estate leans (12 U.S.C. § l464 {c)(l)(B) and
(c)(2)(A)), the statute ls silent with respect to due-on-sale
clauses or other loan details.
The Board is statutorily authorized to promulgate
regulations

4

and has shown no reluctance to do so.

(See 12

3. We note that in ~ellenkamn the property was an owneroccupied single fami)y d•elling, whereas here the property is
investment commercial property. While we are aware that a
similar question is presently pending before the California
Supreme Court (Dawn Investment Co. v. Superior Court (L.A.
31413) hg. gr. April 27, 1981), we perceive no sound reasons to
n_Q_w restrict the ~elle11kamp doctrine exclusively to residential
pToperty.
4.
"In order to provide local mutual thrift Institutions in
which people may inv~st their funds and in order to provide for
the financing of ho~~s. the Board ls authorized, under such
rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the
organi:ation, inco"p~ration, examination, operation, and
regulation of cssoclJtions to be known as 'Federal Savings and
Loan Associations', or 'Federal mutual savings banks' (but only
in the case of instltutions which, prior to conversion, were
State mutual savinos banks located in States which authorize
the chartering of State mutual savings banks, provided such
conversion is not !n contravention of State law), end to issue
(Fn. continued next page.)
4
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L. F. f •
:i~~r~

P. : i

;: ·_.

cl0usec-;,

', '' \ -

',

1• G .

)

however,

H1 e

f i rs t spec i f i c men t i on o f due - 0 .-, _

did not appear until a regulation was

enacted, effective July l, 1976, providing as follows:

"An

assor:iation continues to have the power to include, as a matter
of contract between i t and the borrower, a provision in its
loan instrument whereby the association may, at its option,
declare immediately due and payable sums secured by the association's security instrument if all or any part of the real
property securing the loan is sold or transferred by the barrower

~ithout

the association's prior written consent.

Except

as provided in paragraph (g) of this section with respect to
loans made after July 31, 1976, on the security of a home
occupied or to be occupied by the borrower, exercise by the
association of such option (hereafter called a due-on-sale
clause) shall be exclusively governed by the terms of the loan
contract, and all rights and remedies of the association and
borrower shall be fixed and governed by that contract."

(12

C.F.R. § 545.6-11 (f), amended and recodified at § 545.8-3 (f)
0980).)
The pivotal question to be decided is whether the
federal regulation overrides state law embodied in California
Civil Code section 711, as interpreted in Wellenkamo.

charters therefor, ~iving primary consideration to the best
precticcs of local ~utual thrift and home-financing institutions in the United States." (12 ll-.5.C. § 1464, subd. (a){l).)
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Federal Preemption
pree~ption

The
t~e

clause of

doctrine arises under

th~

federal constitution which states:

supremacy
"This Consti-

tution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof; .
land; and

th~

shall be the supreme law of the

Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,

anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

(U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.)

But

the enumerated powers of the federal government are expressly
I

limited:

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the

Constitution, nor

~rohibited

by it to the States, are reserved

to the States respectively, or to the
Amend. X.)

people.~

(U.S. Const.,

The United States Supreme Court has exhibited con-

siderable restraint in finding federal preemption of state law
by requiring either "such actual conflict

bet~een

the two

schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area,
[or] • .

evidence of a congressional design to preempt the

field."

(Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul (1963) 373 U.S. 132,

141; accord People v. Conklin (1974) 12 Cal.3d 259, 264, app.
dism. 419 U.S. 1064.)
With reference to congressional intent, the United
States Supreme Court has declared that a state regulation exercising the state's "historic police powers" is not displaced by
federal law "unless that was the clear and manifest
Congress."

~uroose

{Jones v. Rath Packinq Co. {1977) 430 U.S. 519,

525; Ri~e v. Santa Fe Elevator Coip, (1947) 331 U.S. 218,
6
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of

not cited nor has our own resea;-ch dis-

2}C. i

Co'1.1· .• J

clu~,_·d

any reported e·;idence of a clear congressional mandate

that federal

h;n·e

l~w

shall control the subject matter herein.

While the Congress

ha~

unequivocally expressed its preemptive

design in relation to specific areas of savings and loan
association activlties, 5 the Home Owners' Loan Act makes no
reference to the subject of due-on-sale clauses.
It is clear that the Board has manifested its unqualified intention that the adopted regulations and implementing
policy relating to due-on-sale clauses 'shall occupy a preemptive position over conflicting state law provisions. 6 Such
expression of administrative intent was found controlling in
Glendale Fed. Sav.

b.

loan Ass'n. v. Fox (C.O.Cal. 1978) 459

5. The Home Owners' loan Act specifically provides that federal savings and "loan 2ssociations are exempt from state limitations on the number of branch offices (12 U.S.C. § l464(a)(l)),·
but ore not exempt from more stringent state ·1aws on neighborhood discrimination or consumer credit protection. (laid.)
Further, federal savings end loan associations are exempt from
state taxation greater than that imposed on local financing
institutions. (Id., ot § l464(h).)
6. That intent is expressed in the following language:
"Finally, it was and is the Board's intent to have • • • dueon-sale practices of Federal associations governed exclusively by Federal la·o. Therefore, • • • exercise of due-onsale clauses by Federal associations shall be governed and
controlled solely by § 545.6-11 and the Board's new Statement
of Policy. Federal ~ssoclations shall not be bound by or
Gubject to any confl~cting State law ~hich imposes different • • • due-on-sal~ requirement~, nor shall Federal associations attempt to • . • avoid the limitations on the exercise of
due-on-sale clauses delineated in § 545.6-ll(g) on the ground
that such . • • avoidance of limitations is permissible under
State law." (Preamble to 12 C.F.R. part 545.6-11, 41 Fed.Reg.
18 2 8 7 (I lay 3,

19 7 6) . )

- 7
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F.Supµ. 90J, judcpe'r1t entered, 481 F.Supp. 616 (1979), appe;:il
pending (9th Cir. 1979).

But we cannot equate the Hoard's

expression of intent with the requisite congressional intent
sir>ce the ultirc,ate question to be
has .

an~wered

is "whether Conaress

ordained that the state regulation shall yield."

(Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 146;
emphasis added.)
But despite the lack of express congressional design,
federal law by implication may operate to the exclusion of
state law "where.compliance with bath federal and state regulations ls a physical impassibility" or where there is an "impossibility of dual compliance .

• resulting . in

an

inevitable collision between the two schemes of regulation, • • • "

(Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, supra, 373

u.s:

at pp. 142-143.)
In an early case a federal district court - confronted
with the question whether a federally chartered savings and
loan association was required to obtain a state certificate to
transact business in the state - held in favor of federal preemption reasoning

th~t:

"The [Home Loan Bank) Board has ·

adopted comprehensive rules and regulations concerning the
powers and operations of every federal savings and loan essocia tion from its cradle to its corporate grave."

(People, etc.

v. Coast Federal Sav. & Loan Ass•n. (S.O.Cal. 1951) 98 f.Supp.
311, 316.)

This broad declaration of lifetime supremacy has

been cited with approval in a number of subsequent decisions

- B
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ui1ifn1mly holu1nr.;

tl1:cit

~Lite

Liv. may not regulate or otherwise

inLcrfere v.itr1 thl: internal affairs of federal savings and loan
associations.

(See e.g. Conference of Federal Sav. & Loan

!1.ssn's v. Stein (9th Cir. 1979) 604 F.2d 1256, aff'd. 445 U.S.
921 [proceedings for credit discrimination); Kupiec v. Republic
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (7th Cir. 1975) 512 F.2d 147, 150
[use of membership records); Meyers v. Beverly Hills Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n (9th Cir. 1974) 499 F.2d 1145, 1147 (prepayment penalties); Rettig v. Arlington Hghts. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n (N.0.111 .. 1975) 405 F.Supp. 819, 1 823 [fiduciary obligations of directors and officers]; City Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Cro-.ley (E.D.Wisc. 1975) 393 F.Supp. ,644, 655 [fees
received by directors and officers]; Kaski v. first Fed.
Ass'n of Madison (1976) 72 Wisc.2d 132 [240 N.W.2d

s &L

367][inter~

est rate escalation]; Sears v. First Federal Savings and L.
Ass'n of Chicago (1971) 1 Ill.App.Jct 621 [275 N.E.2d 300)
[trust accounts for taxes and insurance]; see also Oerenco,
Inc. v. Benj. Franklin Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass•n (1978) 281 Or.
533 (577 P.2d 477], cert. den. 439 U.S. 1051.)
Although that general proposition reflects a correct
statement of law, ~~ are not per~uaded that exfstina state law
pertaininq to the CXP.rcise of due-on-sale Clauses in any way
infringes uoon or is otherwise incompatible with the requlation
or operation of the internal affairs of federal savinqs end
loan associations.

(See

Holid~v

Acres v. Midwest Fed. Sev. &

Loan Ass'n (April J, 1981, No. 338)

Minn. ___ .)

The

9
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feder~l r~g~l~t1on m~~ely

ing~

authorizes and does not compel sav-

.

and loar1 associations to include a due-on-sale clause in

their loan sontracts and to exercise their rights thereunder .
(Id., at pp. 14-15.)
more stringent

•

As noted, California law imposes a

requir~ment

enforcing a due-on-sale clause only

upon a showing that the lender's security will be either
impaired or subjected to risk of default as a
the transfer.

conse~uence

of

But the federal loan association is not faced

with physical impossibility in complying with the two regulatory schemes.

Instead, the federal regulation leaves the

rights and remedies of the parties intact under the terms of
the loan contract.

Thus, enforcement of the due-on-sale clause

rests upon conventioral contract and property principles under
state law.

(Id., at p 10.)

There ls no "inevitable collision"

between the two regulations.

(Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul,

supra, at p 143.)
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC),
appearing as amicus curiae, urges e finding of federal preemption based on a claim of need for national uniformity of loan
practices and lnstruments. 7 In response, we rely upon the

•

Typed opinion

p~ges

14-15.

7. Briefly stated, the argument ls made that due-on-sale
clauses, by keeptng the life of a mortgage relatively short,
increase the lenders' yield end thereby promote the national
interest by keeping overall interest rates down. Further, by
providing a higher yield and a rapid return of capital to the
(fn. continued next page.)

10
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persuJsiv~

lan~uJc1e

of the Minnes8la Supreme Court:

"If thi 5

national interest were indeed an important policY., it seems
in~lusion

that the

than permitted."

of such clauses would be mandated rather
(Holiday Acres v. Midwest Red. Sav. & Loan

Ass'n, supra, p. 15.)
state

la~

Nor, we think, would application of

to the exercise of due-on-sale clauses interfere with

the federal objectives embodied in the Home Owners' Loan Act.
That legislation was enacted during a period of severe economic
depression in order to asoist financially distressed homeowners., It would be "unreasonable, and ironic, to hold now
that the Congress intended [the act] to justify the removal of
homeowners' protections under state law."

(Id., at p. 17.)

Our conclusion finds further support in the particular
provisions of the deed of trust employed herein.

The form of

instrument is apparently one promulgated by the FHLMC itself;
its use is a precondition to purchase of the mortgage by
FHLMC.

The trust

in~trument

"non-uniform" covenants.

contains so-called "uniform" and

The uniform covenants are intended

for nationwide use while the non-uniform covenants ere tailored
to particular state mortgage requirements. B

For

example~

the

lenders, due-on-sale clauses render the loans marketable in the
secondary mortgage ~arket, thereby attracting new funds to the
QOrtgage market and, in turn, again keeping interest rates
down. FHLMC, as purchaser of conventional mortgages, will
purchase only those mortgages using the standardized f.HLMC/FNMA
loan instrument employed here.
8.

Paragraph 15 of the deed of trust provides: "This form
(fn. continued next page.)
11
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"non-uniform" covenants employed herein include California
sta~utoiy

requirements regarding notice (Civ. Code, § 2924(b))

reinstatem~nt

(Civ. Code, § 2924(c)) and the furnishing of a

statement of obligation (Civ. Code, § 2943).
Included- in the "uniform" covenants found in paragraph
15 is the express proviso that:

"This Deed of Trust shall be

qoverned by the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property
is located.

In the event that any provision or clause of this

Deed of Trust or Note conflicts with applicable law, such confllct shall not affect other provisions ••
added.)

"

(Emphasis

We believe such language expresses an unmistakable

intention that state law s~all govern the int~rpretation, validity and enforcement of the loan-security instrument.
Waiver
Notwithstanding the relevant federal regulation,
federal savings and loan associations are authorized to waive
their rights under the due-on-sale clause. 9 Thus, it has

deed of trust combines uniform covenants for national us~ and
non-uniform covenants with limited variations by jurisdiction
to constitute a uniform security instrument covering real
property. This Deed of Trust shall be governed by the law of
the jurisdiction in ~hich the Property is located. In the
event that any provision or clause of this Deed of Trust or
Note conflicts ~ith applicable law, such conflict shall not
affect other provisions • • • • "
9. Under the Board's statement of policy, savings and loan
associations are empowered to waive their rights under the
due-on-sale clause: "The Board believes there may be (in
(Fn. continued next page.)
12
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been held that where

~

federal agency contracts with a private

individuJl and the contract provides that state }aw governs the
contract, state law will apply even in the face of general
federal preemption.

(United States v. Stewart (9th Cir. 1975)

523 F.2d 1070 [California's anti-deficiency judgment statute
controls where trust deed provided for interpretation under
California law]; see United States v. Yazell (1966) 382 U.S.
341, 353.)

Since the subject deed of trust contains a similar

provision invoking the "law of the jurisdiction in which the
property is situated" in construing th~t instrument, we conclude that Pan American federal Savings and Loan Association
has effectively waived any claim of federal preemption.
In conclusion, we hold that California law is not
preempted by virtue of the relevant federal regulation.

There~

fore, we reverse the judgment and remand for further

in

addition to the circumstance prescribed in§ 545.8-3(g)
which exercise of a due-on-•ale clause ls prohibited) situations in ~hich it ~ill be appropriate for a federal association to uaive its contractual right to accelerate a loan.
Those situations include transfer of title to members of the
borrower's immediate family, including a former spouse in
connection uith a divorce, who occupy or will occupy.the property (to the extent not covered by.§ 545.8-3(g)). Associations also should consider waiving, in cases of extreme hardship to the existino borrower, any right to require en increase
in interest rate under a due-on-sale clause." (12 C.F.R. §
556.9(c).)
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pro cc e d iri gs '- o 11 c, \ ', t. l' r, t w i th the views expressed herein.
CERTIFIED FCfl PUBLICATION

Racanelli, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

Elkington, J.

Grodin, J.
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